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2How Time Preferences Differ:
Evidence from 45 Countries
Abstract
We present results from the first large-scale international survey
on time discounting, conducted in 45 countries. Cross-country varia-
tion cannot simply be explained by economic variables such as interest
rates or inflation. In particular, we find strong evidence for cultural
differences, as measured by the Hofstede cultural dimensions. For ex-
ample, high levels of Uncertainty Avoidance or Individualism are both
associated with strong hyperbolic discounting. Moreover, as applica-
tion of our data, we find evidence for an impact of time preferences
on the capability of technological innovations in a country and on
environmental protection.
Keywords : Time preferences; Intertemporal decision; Endogenous prefer-
ence; Cross-cultural comparison.
JEL classification: D90, F40
31 Introduction
The discount rate is one of the most fundamental concepts in finance and
economics. It has been widely applied in asset pricing, project evaluation,
decisions on investment and saving, among many others. In this article we
measure discount rates empirically in a large sample across 45 countries and
reveal several influencing factors for individual and cultural differences in
time discounting.
1.1 Motivation for an international survey
There is abundant evidence that people differ in time preferences, see Fred-
erick, Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2002) for a survey. Many factors have
been proposed in the literature that could influence time discounting. We
will summarize some of these predictions in Sec. 3.2 and derive an economic
model that justifies some of these predictions in a coherent framework in
Sec. 2.1.
Given that many of these variables (economic, but also cultural) natu-
rally vary between different countries, it seems very interesting to test some
of the influencing factors in a cross-country sample. Most previous cross-
cultural studies involve very few countries for comparison, and have inherent
difficulties in distinguishing socio-economic and cultural factors. For exam-
ple, the United States and China are different in many dimensions, including
economic situation, political system, and cultural roots. It is hard to deduce
what causes observed differences in risk preferences and time discounting.
To study more systematically the impacts of country-level factors, it is help-
ful to include other countries. Including, e.g., Japan, with similar cultural
roots as China, but similar economic development and political system as the
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U.S., helps to disentangle these factors. Including countries in Eastern Eu-
rope with European cultural roots, but similar modern political experiences
as China, is another example how a larger international sample can provide
new insights.
In this article, we present results from an international survey of eco-
nomics students from 45 countries on time preferences. The relatively large
number of countries included in our survey allows us to link the measured
time preferences with the background of the countries. We elicit time dis-
counting for different time horizons (one month, one year, and ten years).
Our main findings are:
• Time discounting for short time horizons exhibits much higher hetero-
geneity than for longer time horizons.
• The discount rate for one year is much higher than the discount rate
for ten years, which is consistent with hyperbolic discounting.
• Participants from countries with higher GDP per capita and lower
growth rate are more willing to wait for higher returns, whereas the
inflation rate has surprisingly only an effect on the one-month waiting
tendency, but not on discounting for one and ten years.
• Cultural factors as captured by the Hofstede dimensions (Hofstede
1991) contribute also significantly to time discounting. In particu-
lar, on an individual level Long-term Orientation (a concept measuring
respect for tradition versus orientation towards the future) decreases
hyperbolic discounting and increases the willingness to wait for higher
returns. Similar effects can be found in countries with a low degree of
Uncertainty Avoidance. The effects of Individualism are more com-
plex, and do not seem to support the cushion hypothesis (Hsee &
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Weber 1999, Mahajna, Benzion, Bogaire & Shavit 2008).
• We also find countries that with a higher pace of time (e.g., more
punctuality and higher working speed) are more likely to choose the
more “patient” option.1
• The measured time preferences, especially the tendency to wait, can
predict fairly well country-level innovation and environmental sustain-
ability measures.
There could be two major concerns about the survey method we adopted
here. The first point is that we only used university students as subjects,
not a representative sample of the total population. There are, however,
several advantages of this sample selection: (1) First and second year eco-
nomic students understand better the numeric formulations of lottery and
time-preference questions than the general public, but can still answer the
questions intuitively. (2) Students from economics can also be expected to
play an important role in economics and financial markets in each country
and in the global market. The time and risk preferences we study here are
relevant for those finance-related activities. (3) Moreover, as Hofstede (1991),
a leading researcher in cross-cultural comparisons, emphasized: to make a
cross-national comparison, it is important to recruit homogeneous, compa-
rable groups from each country in order to control the background variables
as much as possible.
The second concern about our survey method might be that we only asked
hypothetical questions without offering real monetary incentives, such that
participants may not be motivated to give thoughtful answers. However,
1We use the term time discounting, time preference, and patience interchangeably for
convenience, although strictly speaking, the three concepts are not identical.
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researchers who compared directly the real and hypothetical rewards did
not find systematic differences, e.g., Johnson & Bickel (2002).2 Moreover,
hypothetical questions have even some advantages in the domain of time
preferences because they allow to ask questions involving a long time span
and large payoffs (Frederick et al. 2002).
The collected data on time preferences offer many potential applications.
As examples, we demonstrate that the average country-level time preference
measured from our survey is related to some general phenomena such as a
country’s innovation capability and environmental sustainability, even after
controlling for macro-economic variables. Although the collected data do not
allow us to analyze the direct causal relationship, our results can be useful to
form hypotheses for further empirical investigation and theoretical modeling.
The rest of this article is organized as follows: In the second section, we
discuss a theoretical model for time discounting and derive its predictions.
Moreover, we present the survey methodology. In the third section we sum-
marize the key results. In the final section we discuss applications to explain
the effects of time preferences on innovations and environmental protection
and outline possible future research directions for which this survey data
could be used.
2In a pilot study, we conducted the survey in different classes in the economic de-
partment at the University of Zurich. For the lottery questions, we also used monetary
incentives following the BDM procedure (Becker, Degroot & Marschak 1964). No signif-
icant differences were found across different classes and between the monetary-incentive
group versus the hypothetical-question group.
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2.1 Intertemporal decisions under constraints
Most standard economic models assume that time discounting or time pref-
erences are exogenous. One can argue that in a perfect capital market where
individuals can borrow and lend freely, the personal taste concerning time
preference should not matter, because intertemporal choices can be made
such that the discount rate corresponds with the interest rate in the mar-
ket. If markets were perfect (and people perfectly rational) then we would
measure in our survey discount rates that equal market interest.
Many studies, however, have shown that discount rates tend to be much
larger (compare the survey of Frederick (2005)). One of the reasons why that
might be the case is, that in reality markets are far from perfect: even in
countries with well-developed financial systems there are many constraints,
particular on borrowing money. They can be institutional or cultural in
nature: in some countries, obtaining a loan might be impossible for many
people (compare Beck, Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt & Peria (2008) for an international
comparison study on this issue), in other countries taking a loan for con-
sumption might be considered simply as foolish behavior that could reduce
reputation substantially.
Depicting the decision problem in a diagram where x- and y-axis are the
consumption in period t and t + 1, respectively, we can display the possible
consumption streams induced by a decision for obtaining A at time t or X
at time t+ 1. Figure 1 shows the following cases:
(a) Complete market without restrictions: both options are only equally
good if both lines coincide, i.e. if X = RA, where R is the market
interest.
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(b) No financial market access: both options are only equally good if they
lie on the same indifference curve. We will discuss this problem below.
(c) The first intermediate case: differences in interest for borrowing and
investing. If differences become large, this case resembles the case (b),
if the differences are small, this case approaches case (a).
(d) The second intermediate case: borrowing is not possible, but investing
is. In this case the problem will usually coincide with problem (a).
Whatever the reason, we have to consider the possibility that people do
not have the possibility to arrange the money in a free way between the two
time periods, but indeed have to stick to what is offered.
In this case, the choice between an amount A at time t and X at time
t+ 1 is (applying the classical utility model for intertemporal decisions) the
choice between the utilities
U1 = u(wt + A) + δu(wt+1) and U2 = u(wt) + δu(wt+1 +X),
where wt denotes the wealth at time t, u is the utility function and δ is the
endogenous time discounting that is in itself independent of the interest rate,
but might depend, e.g., on the probability to live up to the time t+ 1.
Finding the value X for which a person is indifferent between both op-
tions, i.e. where U1 = U2, leads to a fairly simple numerical problem. We
are, however, more interested in how X changes when exogenous conditions
change, in particular when wealth level, wealth increase, risk aversion and
market interest rate change.
To this purpose it is useful to linearize the problem. We can rewrite the
equation U1 = U2 as
u(wt + A)− u(wt) = δu(wt+1 +X)− δu(wt+1). (1)
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Figure 1: Choices between a gain at time t or a delayed, but larger gain at
time t+1. The optimization problem differs depending on the accessibility of
financial markets: (a) full access, (b) no access, (c) full access with borrowing
costs, (d) investing, but no borrowing.
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Using a Taylor expansion of u at wt for u(wt+A) and at wt+1 for u(wt+1+X)
gives
u′(wt)A+O(A2) = δu′(wt+1)X +O(X2),
where O(f(x)) denotes the Landau symbol, i.e. terms of order f(x) or higher.
Assuming that A and X are small we get the approximation
δ
u′(wt+1)
u′(wt)
=
A
X
. (2)
This equation is very similar to the standard intertemporal optimization
problem where the time discounted marginal rate of substitution equals the
market interest. In our case, however, the right hand side is not the market in-
terest, but the ratio between the two payoffs that make the agent indifferent,
i.e. his revealed time discounting (where smaller values of A/X correspond
to a stronger time discounting).
The intuition behind this formula is that the utility gain given by X in
the future (hence discounted by delta) is equal to the utility gain by A now.
Thus their quotient is one. Both utility gains can then be approximated by
the marginal utility times the wealth increase (A or X, respectively) which
gives equation (2).
Based on this model, we can make the following observations about the
influence of various parameters on the time discounting:
First, A/X depends on δ, the endogenous time discounting, but not on
the market interest R. This is rather obvious in this setting, since the de-
cision is made independently of the market. It implies particularly that
uncertainty about the future directly affect time discounting, since they in-
crease the probability that due to whatever reason the future payment will
not be obtained.
Second, we have the following general results whose proofs can be found
in the appendix:
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Proposition 1. Suppose that a strictly risk averse expected utility agent faces
the decision between obtaining A at time t and X at time t+ 1 such that the
general equation (1) holds. Then a higher wealth growth leads to a stronger
time discounting, i.e. if g := wt+1/wt increases, then A/X decreases.
Proposition 2. Assume that (1) holds. Then a higher level of risk aversion
(e.g., if u(x) = xα/α, a smaller α) leads to higher time discounting.
Proposition 3. Assume that (1) holds. If wealth growths with a fixed growth
rate g, i.e. wt+1 = gwt with g ≥ 1, then:
(i) If u has constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), then time discounting
is independent of the wealth level wt.
(ii) If u has decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), and in particular if
u is CRRA, then time discounting decreases when the wealth level wt
increases.
Proposition 4. Assume that (2) holds and that u(x) = xα/α (CRRA). If
there is inflation (i.e. all future wealth and payoffs are reduced by a factor (1−
i) < 1), then the higher the inflation rate, the stronger the time discounting.
These results are summarized in Table 1, where we assume that u is
CRRA.
2.2 Measuring time preference
We have now derived a number of predictions about time discounting and
describe in the following how we have measured it in our survey.
We have asked three hypothetical questions to measure time preferences.3
The first question is a binary choice question taken from Frederick (2005),
3Some studies have reported differences between elicitation methods such as matching
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Financial market access: Variable: Effect on time discounting:
Full Market interest Increasing
Limited
Growth rate Increasing
Risk aversion Increasing
Wealth level Decreasing
Inflation rate Increasing
Table 1: Theoretical influence of various factors on time discounting depend-
ing on access to a financial market.
which we refer to as the “wait-or-not” question in the rest of the article. The
question is presented as follows:
Which offer would you prefer?
A. a payment of $3400 this month
B. a payment of $3800 next month
To measure the implicit discount rate more directly, in the next two ques-
tions, we asked participants to give the amount of a delayed payment which
makes them indifferent with an immediate payment. We refer to these two
questions as the “one-year matching question” and the “ten-year matching
question,” respectively. These two questions are:
and choice, e.g., Read & Roelofsma (2003). Although we asked time preference questions
in both decision modes (i.e., choice and matching), our survey design did not mean to
draw any definite conclusions of these two elicitation methods, because we focus more on
systematic cross-country variations instead of cross-question variations.
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Please consider the following alternatives
A. a payment of $100 now
B. a payment of $ X in one year from now
X has to be at least $ , such that B is as attractive as A.
Please consider the following alternatives
A. a payment of $100 now
B. a payment of $ X in 10 years from now
X has to be at least $ , such that B is as attractive as A.
2.3 Measuring risk preferences
We also measured risk preferences in a different section of the questionnaire
by asking the participants’ willingness to pay for some hypothetical lotteries.
In a separate paper, we will discuss how to use these responses to fit Prospect
Theory parameters. In the present paper, we check the relationship of time
preference with a measure on the revealed risk attitude in gains. It is com-
puted as the Relative Risk Premium (RRP) for a lottery in the gain domain
where one can win $10000 with 60% probability (and otherwise nothing):
The RRP is calculated as (WTP −EV )/EV . (This definition has been used
in a similar context, e.g. by Fehr-Duda, Epper, Bruhin & Schubert (2011)).
We refer the mean RRP of the two lottery questions as Risk Premium in our
regression analysis later.
2.4 Measuring cultural dimensions
Culture is typically defined as something stable over time that distinguishes
different groups. One of the most influential measurements for culture has
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been developed by the Dutch sociologist Geert Hofstede during his long-term
research on cross-national organizational culture. Five persistent cultural
dimensions were found across different nations and different times (Hofstede
2001). In the second part of our questionnaire, we used the Values Survey
Module (VSM94) developed by Hofstede and his colleagues to measure the
cultural dimensions (Hofstede 2001). In particular, we will report the results
that involve the following three cultural dimensions:
• Individualism (IDV): IDV measures the degree to which the society
reinforces individual or collective achievement, and the extent to which
people are expected to stand up as an individual as compared to loyal
affiliation to a life-long in-group (e.g., extended family, friends, etc.).
The opposite of individualism is collectivism. For example, the U.S. has
an individualistic culture, whereas Japan has a collectivistic culture.
The index is calculated from four questions in our questionnaire where
the participants were asked to rate the importance of the described
feature for an ideal job (1=of utmost importance; 5=of very little or
no importance) : (1) sufficient time for your personal or family life;
(2) good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting,
adequate work space, etc.) (3) security of employment; (4) an element
of variety and adventure in the job.
• Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI): A high score of UAI indicates that a
society is afraid of uncertain, unknown and unstructured situations. It
is derived from four questions. The first question is “How often do
you feel nervous or tense at work (1=never; 5=always)?” The rest of
the questions asked the participants to what extent they agree with
each of the following statements (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly dis-
agree): (1) One can be a good manager without having precise answers
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to most questions that subordinates may raise about their work; (2)
Competition between employees usually does more harm than good;
(3) A company’s or organization’s rules should not be broken – not
even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest.
• Long Term Orientation (LTO): When using a Chinese Value Survey
in East Asia, Hofstede (1991) identified a fifth dimension “long-term-
orientation,” or Confucian Dynamism, which captures the society’s
time horizon. It reflects to what extent a society has “a dynamic,
future-oriented mentality.” A higher score implies that the past is val-
ued less than the future, and people may look more forward. We mea-
sure this by asking participants to rate the importance of the following
questions: (1) “In your private life, how important is ‘respect to tra-
dition’ for you (1=of utmost importance; 5=of no importance)?” (2)
“How important is ‘thrift’ for you (1=of utmost importance; 5=of no
importance)?”
There are alternative measures for culture, most notably the Schwartz
dimensions (Schwartz 2004), but they are least frequently used than the
Hofstede dimensions and it was not possible for us to include more than
one scale into our questionnaire. Therefore we discuss only the effect of the
Hofstede cultural dimensions which we measured in our sample directly.
2.5 The survey instrument
A total of 5912 university students in 45 countries/regions participated in
our survey. Most participants were first or second year students from de-
partments of economics, finance and business administration. The average
age of participants was 21.5 years (SD=3.82). Fifty-two percent of the par-
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ticipants were males. The survey yielded 5903 responses for the first time
discounting question, 5632 for the second questions, and 5546 for the third
questions.
Each participant was asked to fill in a questionnaire that included 14
decision making questions (three time preference questions, one ambiguity
aversion question, and 10 lottery questions), 19 questions from the Hofst-
ede VSM94 questionnaire, a happiness question and some information about
their personal background, nationality and cultural origin. The questionnaire
was translated into local languages for each country by professional trans-
lators or translators with economic background. The amount of monetary
payoffs in the questions were adjusted according to each country’s Purchasing
Power Parity and the monthly income/expenses of the local students. The
participants were instructed that there are no wrong or correct answers to
these questions, and that the researchers are only interested in their personal
preferences and attitudes. In most cases, the survey was conducted during
the first fifteen to twenty minutes of a regular lecture under the monitoring
of the local lecturers and experimenters. The response rate was therefore
very high (nearly 100%).
3 Results
3.1 Measured level of time discounting
3.1.1 To wait or not
In this section, we evaluate the results from the “wait-or-not” question ($3400
this month or $3800 next month). Figure 2 shows the percentage of the par-
ticipants in each country who chose to wait for $3800 next month. We observe
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a wide range of variation on the country level – the percentage of students
who chose to wait ranged from only 8% in Nigeria to 89% of Germany. Note
that the implicit interest rate in this question is as high as 11.8% per month
(i.e., an annual discount rate of 280%), which is far higher than the market
interest rate and inflation rates in any of these countries at the time of the
survey. Therefore, the large variation across countries is hard to be justified
purely by the differences in market interest rates or inflation rates.
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Figure 2: Percentage of Participants Who Choose to Wait
In particular, 68% of our U.S. sample chose to wait (N=72). For com-
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parison, in the survey by Frederick (2005) where he used the same question
with a relatively large sample (N=807) of U.S. undergraduate students from
several universities, only around 41% students chose to wait. Among those
students who scored high in a separate Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT),
there were 60% choosing the waiting option, which is closer to our result.
The potential reason is that our participants were studying economics, and
thus more likely to take the market interest rate into account. On the other
hand, even 68% for the U.S. sample is still significantly lower than the per-
centage in Germanic/Nordic countries like Germany (89%), Austria (88%),
Switzerland (87%), and Norway (85%). This difference is hard to explain
only by wealth, education and the macro-economic situations.4
Each participant has stated not only their nationality, but also the cul-
ture they feel they belong to. We classified each participant into one of
seven cultural clusters, mostly following the classification scheme suggested
by Chhokar et al. (2007). Figure 3 shows the percentage of choosing the wait
option within each cultural cluster. In general, the Germanic/Nordic group
are far more likely to wait (88% chose to wait) than other cultural clusters.
Anglo, Middle East, and East Asia are similar (around 66% to 70%), then
followed by East Europe, Latin America and Latin Europe (around 52%
to 59%). Africa has the lowest percentage of participants choosing to wait
(34%). These discrepancies might be of cultural or of economic origin. We
will discuss later the relative importance of both reasons.
4Even for the students from Princeton University, the percentage choosing the patient
option is lower than the percentage of German students (80% vs. 89%). Actually some
students from our Norway survey even complained that the question was ridiculous because
everybody would choose to wait for one month given the high implicit interest rate.
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Figure 3: The percentage of choosing to wait grouped by cultural origin
Note: The column shows the percentage of participants who chose to the $3800
option when they were asked to choose between $3400 this month or $3800 next
month. The respondents were asked about which culture they thought they belong
to. We exclude those participants who do not live in their own countries. We group
the countries into seven cultural clusters based on the classification from Chhokar,
Brodbeck & House (2007).
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3.1.2 Measured subjective discount rate
Inferred Discount Rate: The Classical Approach
To infer discount rates from intertemporal decisions, we use the relation-
ship between the present value of a cashflow, denoted by P , and its future
value, denoted by F . Formally,
F = P (1 +R)t,
where R is the discount rate and t is the time to be waited. Since both P
and t are given in our questions, the inferred discount rate can be obtained
easily from
R = (F/P )(1/t) − 1.
We have two questions to infer the subjective discount rate, where t equals
to 1 year and 10 years, respectively.
The classical approach states that there is only one “market riskless discount
rate”, which is supposed to be the same for all individuals. Our results indi-
cate that this is not the case. Figure 4 shows the implicit annual interest rate
for one-year and 10-year matching questions. We observe substantial varia-
tions of the implicit interest rate across individuals and across countries. The
median R1year is 100%, ranging from 14% in Australia to 1358% in Bosnia &
Herzegovina, whereas median R10year is 29%, ranging from 7% in Thailand
and Spain to 71% in Bosnia & Herzegovina.5 For all countries except for
Australia, the median R1year is higher than R10year, which is consistent with
5Georgia has an extremely high implicit interest rate, especially for the one-year-
matching question (14900% for the one-year question, and 86% for the ten-year question).
The potential reason is that the survey was conducted two months before the outbreak of
the Russian-Georgian war. The feeling of uncertainty induced by the tensions preluding
the war may have induced high discounts for the near future.
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the typical empirical findings that discount rates decrease with longer time
horizons. This is also true at the individual level. In total, 87% participants
had an implicit interest rate R1year higher than R10year.
The Classical Discounted Utility Model assumes consistent time prefer-
ences by using an exponential discounting model. It implies that the time
preference between any adjacent periods should hold constant. Our results,
consistent with previous empirical findings, show that most people discount
the near future more than the far future, e.g., Thaler (1981) and Benzion,
Rapoport & Yagil (1989). This pattern can be elegantly modeled by the im-
plicit risk approach and the (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting function, which
we will discuss in more details in the following sections.
The Implicit Risk Approach
The above results indicate that even for a single person, the subjec-
tive discount rate varies for different time intervals. In particular, most
people appear to be more impatient for the one-year interval than for the
ten-year interval. Hence we apply alternative models, namely, the implicit
risk approach and the hyperbolic discounting model, which describe better
the empirical results. According to the implicit risk approach (Mischel &
Grusec 1967, Stevenson 1986), risk and time are conceptually separated. It
is assumed that the individual believes that there is a chance that the de-
layed outcome will not happen, which is associated with an implicit risk
premium. People try to avoid delayed positive consequences and prefer de-
layed negative consequences, because both are less certain. Therefore, the
subjective discount rate has two components: a pure, riskless discount rate,
and a risk-related discount rate.
Two extreme hypotheses concerning the effects of risk can be formulated
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Figure 4: Implicit annual interest rate for 1-year and 10-year horizon
within the implicit risk approach (Benzion et al. 1989, Robicheck & Myers
1966). In the one-period-realization of risk hypothesis, risk depends on the
time of the receipt or payment but not on the length of the time period.
Therefore, in addition to the riskless discount rate, denoted by i, there is a
one-time discount rate factor for the implicit risk, denoted by d. Formally,
F = P (1 + d)(1 + i)t.
In contrast, the multiple-period-realization of risk hypothesis assumes that
3.1 Measured level of time discounting 23
risk increases proportionally in time, and the standard equation takes the
form:
F = P [(1 + d)(1 + i)]t = P (1 + d)t(1 + i)t.
Note that in this formulation, the effective implicit discount rate is (1 +
d)(1 + i), which is the same for the one-year and the ten-year period. It is
inconsistent with our observation. Therefore the one-period-realization model
is more plausible.
We had two questions to elicit the future value for one and ten years:
F1year = 100(1 + d)(1 + i),
F10year = 100(1 + d)(1 + i)
10.
It follows that
i = (
F10year
F1year
)1/9 − 1,
d =
F1year
100(1 + i)
− 1.
For all participants, the median value of the riskless interest rate i is 0.23
(Mean=0.25, SD=0.20). The median value of the risk-related discount rate
d is 0.67 (Mean=8.62, SD=77.91).
Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting Model
The Quasi-hyperbolic Discounting model is mathematically equivalent
to the above one-period-realization implicit risk approach, but conceptually
different. It is usually defined in discrete time periods as follows:
u(x0, x1, ..., xT ) = u(x0) +
T∑
t=1
βδtu(xt).
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Figure 5: Median values of Parameters in Hyperbolic Discounting Model for
All Countries
This discount function has been used by Phelps & Pollak (1968) to study
intergenerational discounting and by Laibson (1997) to intra-personal deci-
sion problems. When 0 < β < 1 and 0 < δ < 1, people appear to be more
patient in the long run and less patient for the immediate future. The per-
period discount rate between now and the next period is (1−βδ)/βδ and the
per-period discount rate between any two future periods is (1− δ)/δ, which
is less than (1− βδ)/βδ. Same as in the one-period realization implicit-risk
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approach, the quasi-hyperbolic discounting model assumes a declining dis-
count rate between this period and the next, but a constant discount rate
thereafter. In fact, δ = 1/(1 + i) and β = 1/(1 + d). However, unlike the im-
plicit risk approach which rationalizes the time inconsistent preferences, the
quasi-hyperbolic discounting model has often been discussed in the context
of irrationality, such as lack of control, and thus used to justify the need for
commitment devices. In particular, β refers to the degree of “present bias”.
Larger β implies less present bias. When β=1, the quasi-hyperbolic discount-
ing model coincides with the standard exponential discounting model. We
call the other parameter δ the long-term discount factor.
When we assume a linear utility function, the two matching questions
about time discounting can be represented as:
100 = βδF1year,
100 = βδ10F10year.
Thus δ and β can be inferred from the responses F1year and F10year:
δ = (
F1year
F10year
)1/9,
β =
100
δF1year
.
For all participants, the median value of β is 0.60 (Mean=0.56, SD=0.41),
and the median value of δ is 0.81 (Mean=0.82, SD=0.12). See Figure 5 for
a plot of parameter estimates of β and δ for each country. Note that the
variation in present bias β is much higher than the variation in long-term
discount factor δ. The responses of the two matching questions are highly
correlated (Spearman’s ρ=0.78, p<0.001). However, the present bias param-
eter β and the long-term discount factor δ are only moderately correlated
(Spearman’s ρ=0.250, p < 0.001), indicating that the two components from
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the quasi-hyperbolic model may correspond to different psychological con-
structs or risk perceptions.
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Figure 6: Median hyperbolic discounting functions for U.S., Germany, China,
Japan, Russia (β: present bias; δ: long term discount factor)
As an example, Figure 6 exhibits the discounting function for a median
participant in the U.S., China, Germany, Russia, and Japan. Among these
countries, the U.S. has the highest value of β (=0.78), i.e., the lowest present
bias, followed by Japan (β=0.71). Germany and China have the same β
value (=0.60). Russia has by far the lowest value of β (=0.21), implying a
very impatient attitude for one-year horizon.
Regarding the long-term discounting, the U.S., Germany and Japan have
similar values of δ (around 0.85). Russia and China have the same value of
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Figure 7: Median hyperbolic discounting functions for different cultural clus-
ters (β: present bias; δ: long term discount factor)
δ (=0.77), which is lower than the other three developed countries, implying
a slight less patient attitude in the long term, but the difference is not as
dramatic as that of the present-bias parameter.
Figure 7 plots the median values of β and δ for each cultural cluster. Here
we use the self-reported cultural origins6, but if we use the nationalities as
the culture origin, the results are similar. East Europe and Africa has the
strongest degree of present bias with β around 0.40, whereas Anglo cultures
have the least degree of present bias (β=0.76). The rest cultures have similar
6It corresponds to the question: “I consider myself to belong to the following culture:
[ ](Country in which test is performed) [ ] others (please specify).”
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degree of present bias with β around 0.60. On the other hand, all cultural
groups are very similar regarding the median value of their long-term discount
factor δ (around 0.80).
3.2 Time preferences, culture and economics
3.2.1 Independent variables
We have demonstrated that our measured time preference is very heteroge-
neous across countries. Now we would like to explore macroeconomic and
cultural factors that correlate with the measured time preference. To this
aim we study a number of individual and country-level parameters:
Age and gender
A number of experimental and survey studies find that time preferences are
correlated with personal characteristics such as gender (Silverman 2003), age
(Green, Fry & Myerson 1994), anxiety (Hesketh, Watson-Brown & Whiteley
1998), and even intelligence and working memory (Frederick 2005, Shamosh,
DeYoung, Green, Reis, Johnson, Conway, Engle, Braver & Gray 2008).
Culture
Perception of time is a part of culture. According to Graham (1981), the
concept of time value of money is rooted in “linear-separable” views of Anglo-
American cultures, who view time as a continuum stretching from past to
present to future. In these cultures, time is considered to be an essential
component of money (e.g., via discount rate/interest rate), a notion that we
know from modern economic and finance textbooks. Other cultures, how-
ever, may have dramatically different views of time. In particular, Graham
(1981) explains that Latin American cultures perceive time as a circular con-
cept that repeats itself with a cyclical pattern. This “circular-traditional”
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view of time is the root of the man˜ana attitudes in Mexico and other parts
of Latin America, where people’s activities orient much more to the present
than to the future. Therefore, immediate rewards are preferred. This may
explain the low percentage of subjects who chose to wait in our Latin Europe
and Latin American sample (Figure 3), even though Latin Europe is closer
to Western Europe regarding the economic conditions.
There are other cultural differences that may affect time discounting. Fi-
nancial discounting, for instance, is found to be related to a range of psycho-
logical variables, such as conscientiousness (Daly, Delaney & Harmon 2009).
As Terracciano et al. (2005) reported, that in their sample German Switzer-
land, Sweden, Germany, Burkina Faso, and Estonia have the highest scores
on Conscientiousness, whereas Spain, Turkey, Croatia, Chile, and Indone-
sia have the lowest scores on Conscientiousness. This again seems to be
consistent with our findings: those countries with higher Conscientiousness
score are more likely to wait for the delayed larger reward in our one-month
question.
We should be cautious, however, to simply equate this unwillingness to
wait for the larger payoff to a degree of impatience. As Graham (1981) points
out, due to the large difference in the perception of time, in some cultures,
when a person is forced to choose between immediate and future rewards,
he may view this not as evaluating alternatives: “He was essentially asked if
he wanted something or nothing”– because future rewards were perceived as
of no real value, thus “what one person views as a choice situation, another
views as mandated action.” (Graham 1981, p.341) In the one-year and ten-
year matching questions, when students were asked to state the amount of
money that makes them indifferent, Latin European exhibited similar pref-
erences as Germanic/Nordic cultures, whereas Latin Americans were slightly
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“less” patient. It somehow hints that the one-month waiting question reflects
more about a general attitude, whereas the one-year and ten-year matching
questions may be more treated as evaluative questions.
Another measure for culture are the cultural dimensions by Hofstede
(1991). Here we study three of them: Individualism, Uncertainty avoidance
and Long Term Orientation. (See Sec. 2.4 for more details on the measure-
ment.)
A high score of Individualism implies that individuals are loosely con-
nected to the society, and are expected to take care of themselves. In com-
parison, in a society with collectivistic culture, people can be protected by
some strong cohesive groups throughout lifetime as a reward to their un-
shakeable loyalty. Therefore, the social connection in a collectivist culture
may provide its citizen a “cushion” or safety net for potential losses (Hsee
& Weber 1999), with which people can afford to be more risk-seeking and
more patient. To test the impacts of a collectivistic culture, Mahajna et al.
(2008) compared the subjective discount rates and risk preferences for Is-
raeli Jews and Arabs with bank customers as participants. They examined
two competing hypothesis: If the “cushion” hypothesis were right, then in
a collectivist society (Israeli Arabs), a person would exhibit lower subjec-
tive discount rate (more patience) and lower risk-aversion. In contrast, the
“trust” hypothesis states that Israeli Arabs, who tend to show low levels of
trust, probably due to a difficult political situation and a feeling of being
discriminated, would exhibit higher subjective discount rates (less patience)
and higher risk aversion. Their results show that Israeli Arabs have higher
subjective discount rates, and higher risk-aversion, which is inconsistent with
the “cushion” hypothesis.
Uncertainty Avoidance is another culture dimension relevant to time pref-
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erences. A society with higher Uncertainty Avoidance score tends to be
less tolerant to uncertain situations. Presumably, people from such cultures
should prefer immediate rewards because of the uncertainty about the fu-
ture rewards. To our knowledge, no empirical studies have investigated this
relationship yet.
Hofstede (1991) finds that the Long Term Orientation Score is typically
high in East Asian, especially Confucian cultures, implying that people there
value future more than present, and they are likely to be more patient. More-
over, the concept of “rebirth” in the dominant religions (e.g., Buddhism and
Hinduism) in Southeast Asia reflects the belief that the current life is only
a small portion of the whole existence. In an interesting experiment, Chen,
Ng & Rao (2005) tested whether the influence of an Eastern culture makes
people more patient than the influence of Western culture. By studying the
bicultural Singaporean participants, they find U.S.-primed participants val-
ued immediate consumption more than did Singaporean-primed participants,
hence supported indirectly the hypothesis that high Long Term Orientation
leads to patience.
Risk preference
Frederick (2005) and Dohmen, Falk, Huffman & Sunde (2008) find that peo-
ple with higher cognitive ability tend to be more patient and less risk-averse.
We have already seen in Proposition 2 that a higher risk aversion can lead
to higher time discounting. To control for this effect we include the relative
risk premium (RRP, as defined in Sec. 2.3) into our regression.
Wealth
Becker & Mulligan (1997) proposed a model to capture endogenous time
preferences. It states that the more resources we use to imagine the future,
the more patient we are. It follows that wealth and education leads to pa-
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tience. Most studies find wealthier people are more patient (Hausman 1979,
Lawrance 1991, Harrison, Lau & Williams 2002, Yesuf & Bluffstone 2008).
Poor farm households, for example, tend to have shorter planning horizons
and hence are reluctant to invest in conservation for natural resources (Mink
1993). But there are also several studies that find no relation between wealth
and discount rates (Kirby, Godoy, Reyes-Garcia, Byron, Apaza, Leonard,
Perez, Vadez & Wilkie 2002, Anderson, Dietz, Gordon & Klawitter 2004).
Proposition 3 showed that for DARA investors (which is the standard
assumption in the literature) the theoretical prediction coincides with these
empirical results.
Since we do not have individual wealth or income information, we use
GDP per capita as the proxy for the national wealth.
Economic growth, inflation and interest rate
We have seen in Proposition 4 implies that a higher inflation rate should lead
to higher time discounting. According to Proposition 1 this is also the case
when growth rates are higher.
We include the logarithm of the economic growth rate and the annually
inflation rate of the year before our survey (2007) into the regression analysis.
Since previous times of higher inflation might lead to uncertainty about the
future inflation rate, we repeated all regressions with the log of the maximum
annually inflation rate of the previous ten years. As their was no significant
difference in the results, we refrain from reporting this robustness test.
Finally, for subjects that perceive to have full (or at least substantial)
financial market access when making their decision, the market interest rate
should play an important role. To test for this effect, we use the interest
rates of the country (one month or one year) and two proxies for access of
private persons to financial markets and – in particular – to loans: First, the
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“easiness to obtain a loan” scale from the Global Competitiveness Report
2008-2009 by Porter & Schwab (2008). The variable was computed based on
responses from the business community to the question: How easy is it from
a bank to obtain a loan in your country with only a good business plan and
no collateral? (1=impossible, 7=very easy). Second, the ratio of private debt
to GDP (Beck et al. 2008). Both variables were included into the regressions.
3.2.2 Regression results
To test the hypotheses derived for the variables in the last section, we use a
regression analysis. The main results are presented in Table 1–3, where the
dependent variable is the answer to the waiting question (logit regression,
Table 1) and the hyperbolic time discounting variables β and δ for Table 2
and 3, respectively.7
The results show that there are certain differences between the results for
the three measurements for time discounting. This has to be expected due
to the different elicitation methods for the waiting choice question and due
to the fact that β reflects the “non-rational” part of the time preferences,
while δ corresponds (to some extent) to the rational discounting.
When looking on the impact of demographic information, it is interesting
to notice that gender differences play mostly an insignificant role, but it
seems that female subjects were more prone to the present time bias, i.e. the
discount factor β was smaller (Table 3). Given the on average very young
participants, we refrain from discussing the results for the variable age.
The influence of individual risk preferences are mostly in line with the
theory: higher risk aversion (as captured by a higher RRP) leads to seemingly
7When taking out non-economic majors or students with cultural background different
than their place of study, we did not find significant deviations from the presented results.
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more “impatient” behavior. Only for the binary question we did not obtain
this result.
On the macroeconomic side, the effects were as predicted by Proposi-
tions 1–4: higher wealth (as measured by log(GDP/capita)) increased the
tendency to wait, while a higher inflation rate for most measurements de-
creased the waiting tendency. We also obtained a clear result for the relation
between growth rate and time discounting: in all three settings a higher
growth rate induced higher discounting. These results confirmed the effects
of limited market access as predicted in our model under limited access to
financial markets well.
When testing the influence of factors with respect to free market access,
we found mixed results: while easiness to obtain loans and a large ratio of
private debt to GDP (as another proxy for a good market access) decrease
time discounting as expected, the influence of the interest rate itself was in-
consistent. This might be due to the fact that even in the countries with
highly developed financial markets the majority of subjects had time dis-
counting way above the market rate. Even in these countries, the option to
take a loan now and pay back later with the prospective gain on offer, was
not taken into account by most. Moreover, the difference in interest rates
between these countries was quite small during the period of our study.
Summing up, the empirical results support fully our model of time prefer-
ences without (or with limited) access to financial markets. Market interest
rates do not seem to play such an important role as classical financial theory
would predict.
Whether controlling for macroeconomic conditions or not, we find in any
case strong evidence for a cultural influence on time discounting. This holds
in particular true for the two “behavioral” measurements (waiting tendency
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Table 2: Linear Regression of Waiting Tendency
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
age -0.038*** -0.031** -0.045*** -0.06***
(-2.967) (-2.416) (-3.538) (-4.499)
gender -0.006 -0.015 -0.012 -0.019
(-0.464) (-1.21) (-0.96) (-1.472)
Interest rate 1 month -0.008
(-0.563)
Private debt/GDP 0.146***
(8.263)
easyness to obtain loan 0.102***
(6.38)
inflation rate -0.1*** -0.091*** -0.086***
(-5.899) (-5.279) (-4.46)
Log(growth rate) -0.058*** -0.049*** -0.068***
(-3.949) (-3.356) (-4.578)
log(GDP/capita) 0.156*** 0.137*** 0.073***
(8.492) (7.361) (3.26)
RRP -0.021* -0.013 -0.016
(-1.645) (-1.057) (-1.295)
IDV (country) 0.084*** 0.04**
(5.868) (2.514)
IDV ind. diff. 0.029** 0.03**
(2.348) (2.41)
UAI (country) -0.046*** -0.008
(-3.187) (-0.503)
UAI ind. dif. -0.012 -0.013
(-0.949) (-1.085)
LTO (country) 0.026** 0.078***
(2.016) (4.764)
LTO ind. diff. 0.049*** 0.048***
(3.971) (3.933)
Africa 0.006
(0.429)
Anglo/American 0.058***
(3.029)
Germ./Nordic 0.2***
(8.713)
East Asia 0.092***
(4.7)
L.America -0.007
(-0.418)
L.Europe -0.046***
(-2.98)
E.Europe 0.046**
(2.156)
Middle East 0.091***
(5.547)
R2 (%) 4.9 7.2 8.6 10.9
Delta F 2 100.2 11.7 15.4 18.9
* =significant on 10% level, **significant on 5% level,
***significant on 1% level
* significant at 5% level; **significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
Further controls: native dummy and economist dummy. Missing values were replaced by
average values.
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Table 3: Linear Regression of Present Bias
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
age 0.106*** 0.13*** 0.133*** 0.128***
(8.351) (10.37) (10.59) (9.736)
gender 0.069*** 0.042*** 0.031** 0.029**
(5.414) (3.324) (2.485) (2.291)
Interest rate 1 year 0.087***
(5.722)
Private debt/GDP 0.179***
(9.567)
easyness to obtain loan 0.047***
(2.897)
inflation rate 0.009 0.025 0.044**
(0.521) (1.489) (2.293)
Log(growth rate) -0.164*** -0.164*** -0.182***
(-11.232) (-11.26) (-12.278)
log(GDP/capita) 0.089*** 0.104*** 0.115***
(4.885) (5.617) (5.172)
RRP -0.155*** -0.147*** -0.14***
(-12.296) (-11.71) (-11.204)
IDV (country) -0.076*** -0.028*
(-5.38) (-1.763)
IDV ind. diff. -0.013 -0.013
(-1.028) (-1.09)
UAI (country) -0.08*** -0.044***
(-5.641) (-2.805)
UAI ind. diff. -0.015 -0.015
(-1.19) (-1.238)
LTO (country) -0.098*** -0.089***
(-7.689) (-5.466)
LTO ind. diff. 0.029** 0.029**
(2.359) (2.385)
Africa 0.025*
(1.722)
Anglo/American 0.064***
(3.413)
Germ./Nordic -0.034
(-1.508)
East Asia 0.071***
(3.679)
L.America 0.062***
(3.665)
L.Europe -0.005
(-0.345)
E.Europe -0.048**
(-2.265)
Middle East 0.012
(0.71)
R2 (%) 5.9 9.2 10.6 12.2
Delta F 2 108.2*** 6.7*** 15.4*** 13.3***
* =significant on 10% level, **significant on 5% level,
***significant on 1% level
* significant at 5% level; **significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
Further controls: native dummy and economist dummy. Missing values were replaced by
average values.
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Table 4: Linear Regression of Long-term Discount Factor
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
age 0.034*** 0.05*** 0.059*** 0.065***
(2.647) (3.872) (4.533) (4.721)
gender 0.019 0.008 0.007 0.004
(1.498) (0.583) (0.512) (0.268)
Interest rate 1 year 0.043***
(2.756)
Private debt/GDP 0.123***
(6.477)
easyness to obtain loan 0.054***
(3.219)
inflation rate 0.006 0 0.01
(0.347) (-0.028) (0.526)
Log(growth rate) -0.092*** -0.099*** -0.098***
(-6.135) (-6.53) (-6.341)
log(GDP/capita) 0.106*** 0.115*** 0.153***
(5.667) (6.039) (6.613)
RRP -0.052*** -0.057*** -0.057***
(-4.04) (-4.368) (-4.355)
IDV (country) -0.044*** -0.01
(-3.006) (-0.609)
IDV ind. diff. 0.01 0.01
(0.789) (0.756)
UAI (country) 0.029** 0.03*
(1.991) (1.85)
UAI ind. diff. 0.028** 0.028**
(2.202) (2.167)
LTO (country) -0.03** -0.072***
(-2.307) (-4.285)
LTO ind. diff. -0.001 0
(-0.04) (0.02)
Africa 0.023
(1.553)
Anglo/American -0.007
(-0.35)
Germ./Nordic -0.032
(-1.368)
East Asia 0.023
(1.126)
L.America 0.087***
(4.897)
L.Europe 0.011
(0.704)
E.Europe 0.004
(0.172)
Middle East -0.017
(-1.024)
R2 (%) 2.6 3.5 4 4.6
Delta F 2 49.4*** -5.8*** 5.0*** 4.5***
* =significant on 10% level, **significant on 5% level,
***significant on 1% level
* significant at 5% level; **significant at 1% level; t-values in brackets
Further controls: native dummy and economist dummy. Missing values were replaced by
average values.
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and β). The effects, however, differ: for the waiting tendency, individualism
and long-term orientation played an important role, on the country level,
as well as on the individual level. The influence of long-term orientation
was as predicted, but the effect of individualism was puzzling: it seemed
that individualism induced more “patience” in the “wait-or-not” question.
This seems to contradict the “cushion” hypothesis that would predict the
opposite pattern. When looking, however, on β, the effect of individualism is
as predicted by the cushion hypothesis: there is a negative effect of the mean
individualism on the “patience” of a person, but no significant effect of its
own individualism (as the “cushion” would be made of the people surrounding
the subject, not by the subject itself). The discrepancy might therefore be
due to some specific effect induced by the elicitation of the waiting tendency
question that might call for further investigation.
Given that the evidence for the cushion hypothesis was mixed, we also
tested for a competing hypothesis by Mahajna et al. (2008) who conjecture
that lower income and low trust may have stronger influence than a col-
lectivist culture on time and risk preferences. Since income data were not
collected and there were no measurements for trust, this hypothesis could not
be tested directly. In our questionnaire, we have included a “trust” question
which asked participants to what extent they agree that “Most people can be
trusted.” Therefore, we could test at the individual level, whether the degree
of trust is related with the time discounting measurement, but we found no
significant relationship.
Besides the cultural differences captured by the three aforementioned
Hofstede dimensions, there are of course countless differences that cannot be
captured that easily within a simple survey. We find strong evidence that
these differences also affect time discounting in a significant way: including
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dummy variables with cultural clusters into the regression lead to significant
coefficients, particular for the two “behavioral” time discounting questions.
In general, East Asian and Anglo-American subjects showed ceteris paribus
more “patience”. For β, this also holds true for Latin Americans, whereas for
the waiting tendency question Germanic/Nordic countries showed a signifi-
cant amount of more “patience” than would be expected based on cultural
dimensions, macroeconomic data and the other control variables.
These results suggest that beyond the cultural dimensions by Hofstede,
further cultural differences are key to the understanding of the heterogeneity
in time discounting.
3.2.3 Causal relation between culture and time preferences
We have seen that there are significant relations between culture, as mea-
sured by the Hofstede dimensions, and time preferences. Besides the obvious
interpretation that culture forms preferences, it would be as conceivable that
both are formed independently by underlying factors (besides economic con-
ditions) or that culture is indeed influenced by time preferences.
To find support for a causal influence of culture on time preferences, we
apply an instrumental variable approach. We use two variables that have
already been used as instrumental variables for cultural dimensions: the
distribution of blood types as a proxy for genetic and hence cultural distance,
and the distribution of the main religions as a proxy for different cultural
development in the past (Huang 2007, Spolaore & Wacziarg 2009, Guiso,
Sapienza & Zingales 2009, Gorodnichenko & Roland 2010).
The distribution of blood types has been measured based on the percent-
age of the population in a country having the blood types A, B, AB and O.8
8Values for Croatia, Slovenia, Taiwan and Chile were not available and replaced with
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Table 5: Results from the two-stage least-square regression for IDV on the
waiting tendency for one month with instrumental variables based on the
distributions of blood types and religions. The results are robust and suggest
a causal influence of IDV on this time preference.
Waiting tendency for the one month question
1 2 3 4 5 6
Instruments:
Blood, l1-distance Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Blood, Mahalanobis No No No No Yes No
Religion, Euclidean Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Religion, Mahalanobis No No No No Yes No
Controls:
Age -0.049* -0.056** -0.073** -0.082** -0.078* -0.062**
Gender 0.018 0.015 0.019 0.022 0.019 0.015
log(GDP/capita) 0.196** 0.108** 0.087** 0.076 0.079 0.097**
log(growth rate) -0.046 -0.04 -0.037 -0.02 -0.052*
Inflation -0.099** -0.087** -0.081* -0.07 -0.106**
RRP -0.016
UAI 0.017
LTO 0.041*
IDV 0.558* 0.607** 1.072** 1.310** 1.401** 0.630**
(t-value) (2.27) (2.52) (3.22) (3.15) (2.96) (2.54)
F-statistics 40.8 31.1 20.6 16.5 12.1 19.9
* significant at 5% level; **significant at 1% level
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A good instrumental variable is given by the l1-distance between the blood
type vectors, which is the sum of the absolute differences for each of the four
types.
The difference of two countries with respect to the distribution of the main
religions has been measured as the Euclidean distance between the vectors
reflecting the percentage of protestants, catholics, orthodoxes, muslims, bud-
dhists, jews and others in the countries, where the category “others” was
normalized such that the sum of all categories added to one.
In both cases, “difference” has to be measured with respect to a base
country. Since in both IDV and UAI Sweden showed in our sample the most
extreme values (highest individuality and lowest uncertainty avoidance), we
chose this country as benchmark.
As controls in our two-stage least-square regression we used first age,
gender and log(GDP/capita) and then added inflation and log(growth rate).
As robustness checks we applied both instrumental variables together and
separately and applied the Mahalanobis distance as alternative metric for
both blood types and religions.
We found one highly significant and robust regression result that suggests
a causal relationship between IDV and the tendency to wait in the one-month
question (see Tab. 5). This supports the influence of cultural differences at
least on short-term time preferences.
3.2.4 Pace of time
We are, as pointed out before, not the first to study interactions between cul-
ture and time. We would like to point out another interesting connection to
the linguistically closest neighbors. Colombia and Mexico were excluded due to lack of
data.
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Figure 8: Correlation between Pace of Time and Waiting Tendency
previous work in social psychology. Robert Levine has defined and measured
a concept which he called “pace of time” in a field study across 31 countries.
This overall-pace measure is calculated out of three measures that could be
obtained in most countries: walking speed, postal speed, and clock accuracy
(Levine 1997). Interestingly, we find this measurement is highly correlated
with our measured time preference (r = 0.647, p = 0.002) (see Figure 8).
Furthermore, regression analysis shows that the time pace measure is signif-
icant even when we control for GDP per capita (see Table 6). This can be
most likely understood by considering the discounting effect for disutilities:
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Table 6: Logit regression of Time Pace on Waiting Tendency
Percentage choosing to wait
GDP per cap 0.015
time pace 0.034*
Constant 0.654
N 18
R2 42.1%
* significant at 5% level; **significant at 1% level
Note:
1. The independent variables “GDP per cap” is the natural logarithm of GDP (PPP) per
capita in 2007.
2. The independent variable “time pace” is measured by Levine (1997) in his field study
to capture the tempo and punctuality in a country. The higher score implies higher speed
and more punctuality.
an “impatient” person would be very “patiently” procrastinating some dull
or annoying tasks. This attitude would then manifest itself in slow walk-
ing speed, slow and inaccurate service and the tendency to postpone tedious
tasks like adjusting a watch. We did not have such disutility questions in our
survey, but other surveys found a strong correlation between impatience for
rewards and procrastinating behavior for disutilities (Benzion et al. 1989).
4 Applications and Discussion
4.1 Examples for possible applications
In the following, we want to demonstrate the validity and potential usefulness
of our data on two simple examples. Each of them could be taken as a starting
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point for further research, based on our survey data.
4.1.1 Innovation
In this section, as an example for possible applications of our data, we in-
vestigate whether we can predict a country’s innovation capability by the
measured patience. Technological change and innovation are often treated
as exogenous variable in economic modeling. However, Romer (1990) argues
that it can be endogenously determined. He points out that an increase in
patience will increase research and thus economic growth, which is consistent
with the intuition that one must forego some immediate benefits to invest in
research and innovation, in order to get larger rewards in the future.
We test the relationship of patience with the “innovation factor” from the
Global Competitive Report 2008-2009 (Porter & Schwab 2008). It measures
the technological innovation of a country, in particular investment in research
and development (R & D) in the private sector, the presence of high-quality
scientific research institutions, collaboration in research between universities
and industry, and the protection of intellectual property. We find a positive
correlation between the response of our “wait-or-not” question with the in-
novation factor at the country level. Table 7 shows that after controlling the
wealth level of the country, the response to the waiting question is still highly
significant in predicting the innovation factor, so is the present bias parame-
ter, but the long-term discount factor is not significant. This result suggests
that although the wealth level (and hence a general level of a country’s econ-
omy) is crucial to stimulate innovation, the attitude towards future also plays
an important role. For example, while 69% of Taiwanese participants prefer
to wait in the one-month question, only 44% of our Italian students prefer to
wait. The two countries have the same GDP per capita in 2007, but Taiwan
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scored much higher in the innovation factor than Italy (5.26 vs. 4.19). It is
worthwhile to investigate further to what extent and under what mechanism
a general attitude towards future is related to the innovation activity.
Table 7: Country-level OLS Regression for Innovation Factor
Dependent Variable
Innovation Factor
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 2.362** 2.254** 2.235**
Choosing to wait 1.099**
Present bias β 0.887**
Long term discount δ 0.388
Log(GDP per cap) 0.483** 0.557** 0.651**
N 43 43 43
R2 65.1% 61.8% 56.1%
* significant at 5% level; **significant at 1% level
Notes:
1.The dependent variable “innovation factor” is from Global Competitive Report
2008-2009 (Porter & Schwab 2008). It measures the technological innovation of a country,
in particular investment in research and development (R&D) in private sectors, the
presence of high-quality scientific research institutions, collaboration in research between
universities and industry, and the protection of intellectual property.
2.Angola and Lebanon are excluded because of the lack of data for “Innovation factor.”
3.The independent variable “choosing to wait,” “present bias β,” and “long-term
discount” are transformed to Blom’s proportion estimate to reduce the impacts of outliers.
4.1.2 Environmental sustainability
Studies have revealed that time preference is related to the practice of en-
vironmental preservation. For example, farmers who discount the future
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more strongly were less likely to use soil conservation measures (Yesuf &
Bluffstone 2008). Since the wealth level is one important determinant of
time preference, one may argue that we should focus on poverty reduction
to make people discount the future less. However, it is not clear to what
extent time preference per se is a driving factor for a lack of environmental
concern. We illustrate a regression analysis to examine the relative impacts
of a country’s wealth level (as measured by GDP per capita) and the average
patience level (as measured by our first survey question). The dependent
variable is the “percentage of total land area under protected status” from
the report of Environmental Sustainability Index by Esty, Levy, Srebotn-
jak & de Sherbinin (2005). This measure represents an investment by the
country in biodiversity conservation, which is important for a sustainable
environment. Column one in Table 8 demonstrates an interesting result in
that our measured time preference has an significant impact on protected
area at the country level, whereas GDP per capita is not significant in this
model. Columns (3) and (4) show that the estimated parameter values from
the hyperbolic discounting model, however, are not significant when GDP
is controlled. Column (4) substitutes subjective time-preference measures
with the objective inflation rate, which turns out to be insignificant. The
relatively low R2 can be attributed to measurement errors, as well as other
important variables that are not included in the model. On the other hand,
it is clear that our measured waiting tendency improves the model substan-
tially (R2 increases from 15% to 25%). We also used an alternative measure
from the report of Environmental Sustainability Index by Esty et al. (2005),
namely “the ratio of gasoline price to world average” as dependent variable,
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and obtained similar results, although at less significant level.9 Our finding
is in line with the experimental study by Hardisty & Weber (2009), where
they find that people discount environmental outcomes in a similar way to
monetary outcomes. This would help policy makers to understand societal
discount rates across countries.
4.2 Future directions
Our survey is a first attempt to collect large-scale empirical data on country-
level variations of time preferences. It is to our knowledge the largest inter-
national survey of this kind. We have documented the systematic variation
in time preferences, as compared to the situational and cultural factors of
the countries. Several independent variables in our regression models were
endogenous. Ideally, the parameters should have been estimated by using a
simultaneous equation system. With our cross-section data, it is difficult to
identify instrumental or lagged variables for such analysis. If time series data
could be collected in the future, then one might gain more insights about the
causal relationships. To compare our findings with parallel studies on the
cross-country comparisons on market-level behavior (e.g., equity premium,
price kernel, volatility) would be extremely helpful for cross-validation and
generalization of what has been found.
We have illustrated two applications that use time preference to predict
more general phenomena at the country level, such as innovation and envi-
ronmental preservation. Although the analysis illustrated above is simple in
9The logic behind this index is that unsubsidized gasoline prices are an indicator that
appropriate price signals are being sent and that environmental externalities have been
internalized. High taxes on gasoline act as an incentive for public transportation use and
development of alternative fuels.
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Table 8: Country-level OLS Regression for Environmental Sustainability
Dependent Variable
Percentage of Protected Area
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -0.001 -1.303 -1.022 5.176
Choosing to wait 12.530*
Present bias β -1.784
Long term discount δ -4.811
Inflation Rate -0.510
Log(GDP per cap) 1.557 4.478* 4.932* 2.667
N 43 43 43 43
R2 24.6% 14.4% 15.9% 15.9%
* significant at 5% level
Notes:
1. The dependent variable “Protected area” is taken from the report of 2005 Environmen-
tal Sustainability Index by Esty et al. (2005). It measures the percentage of total land
area under protected status. The logic is that the percentage of land area dedicated to
protected areas represents an investment by country in biodiversity conservation .
2. Hong Kong is excluded because of the lack of data for “Protected area.” Colombia is
excluded because of its extremely high value which distorts the model.
3. The independent variable “choosing to wait,” “present bias β,” and “long-term dis-
count” are transformed to Blom’s proportion estimate to reduce the impacts of outliers.
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its kind, we hope that it can stimulate more in-depth cross-sectional studies
in this direction. Further applications are conceivable. For example, Buiter
(1981) presents a theoretical model using country-level time preference to
explain the capital movement between countries. The model has not been
tested empirically. Shiller (1999) suggests intergenerational and international
risk sharing in pension system, and emphasizes that the international risk
sharing is rarely discussed. Empirical evidence of the degree of time dis-
counting across countries can be an important input for such discussions.
We believe that systematic investigations and documentations of time pref-
erence across countries will deepen our understanding of the discrepancies
across countries, and provide policy makers with useful advice for develop-
ment at the global level.
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A Proofs of mathematical results
Proof of Proposition 1:
Consider two different growth rates g and g′ with g′ > g. If X and X ′
are the payoffs at time t+ 1 that make the agent indifferent in the respective
situations then we obtain the following two equations from (1):
u(wt) + δu(wtg +X)− u(wt + A)− δu(wtg) = 0,
u(wt) + δu(wtg
′ +X ′)− u(wt + A)− δu(wtg′) = 0.
Combining these two equations and dividing by δ we obtain
u(wtg +X)− u(wtg) = u(wtg′ +X ′)− u(wtg′).
Due to the strict concavity of u we have
u(wtg +X)− u(wtg) > u(wtg′ +X)− u(wtg′).
Taking both together we conclude that X ′ > X.
Proof of Proposition 2:
We start from equation (1) and divide by 1 + δ. This gives
1
1 + δ
u(w + A) +
δ
1 + δ
u(wg) =
1
1 + δ
u(w) +
δ
1 + δ
u(wg +X).
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We can reinterpret this equation as an indifference of an expected utility
maximizer between the following two lotteries:
1
1+δ
w + A
δ
1+δ
wg
1
1+δ
w
δ
1+δ
wg +X
If risk aversion increases (e.g. if in u(x) = xα/α and α decreases) then the
more risky lottery (which is the second one since w < w+A, wg+X > wg and
wg > w) becomes less attractive, thus X needs to be higher to compensate
that: we see more time discounting.
Proof of Proposition 3:
We start from equation (1) and divide by 1 + δ. This gives
1
1 + δ
u(w + A) +
δ
1 + δ
u(wg) =
1
1 + δ
u(w) +
δ
1 + δ
u(wg +X).
As in the proof of Proposition 2 we can reinterpret this equation as an indif-
ference of an expected utility maximizer between two lotteries.
The payoffs and probabilities in these lotteries do not depend on w.
Therefore, when we increase w, the preference between them will be con-
stant if and only if the utility function u has constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA). If u has constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), then it has in
particular decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) and therefore the more
risky lottery will be become more attractive when w increases. Hence, to
keep indifference, we have to lower X. This implies that increasing w leads
to less time discounting.
